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The Trouble with Choice: The Roles of Construction, Authenticity, and Appropriation in 
Neoliberal Models of Transgender Identity 
Levi C. R. Hord 
 In Second Skins, Jay Prosser points out that “[a]t the end of the millennium […] gender 
ambivalence ha[d] come to trope [the] very moment of historical turning” (200) – a reality 
seemingly confirmed by the explosion of open transgender identifications and genderqueer 
aesthetics occurring in queer communities today. While I have previously theorized how these 
identifications may occur and be justified at the level of the individual, I want to move this 
phenomenon into the context of larger discourses of subjectivity. My intent in this paper is to 
explore the nuanced networks that allow the doctrines of constructionism and essentialism to 
move throughout queer cultural spheres. The question of how the philosophies of 
constructionism and essentialism are deployed in the real world (i.e., in lived experience) differs 
markedly from that of how the concepts are taken up in theory, and offers us more insight into 
common tropes that emerge in transgender identity narratives. Beginning by situating my claims 
in theories of the neoliberal subject, I will look at how discourses of essentialism and 
constructionism come to be attached to bodies and narratives, and what effect this has on how 
and what identities can be claimed publicly. I will then use these tensions to explore the concept 
of “choice” in identity formation, and what implications the radical deconstruction of identity in 
culture has for the aestheticization of transgender. Moving these claims into the discourse of 
appropriation, I will demonstrate how these accusations are aptly applicable to the power 
dynamics of the adoption of transgender by non-transitioning individuals. I will conclude by 
exploring the impact of this model of identity on queer community formation and practice. 
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 In theorizing an identity that arose at a specific temporal moment, it is useful to work 
within contemporary understandings of subjectivity, including the motivations that are thought to 
drive subjects in late capitalism. The idea of individuality, which was defined during the 
Enlightenment, continues to hold sway over our ideas about subjectivity. Central to discourses of 
the self under neoliberal consumerism is “the idea that the individual is a naturally occurring 
unit, that it is preyed upon and entrapped by society, and that true freedom and fulfillment can 
only be gained by […] giving individuality uninhibited expression” (Mansfield 18). In our 
culture overall, as well as in queer and transgender cultures specifically, the status of personal 
authenticity as an ideal functions to encourage this expression and the self-fulfillment that is said 
to follow. Joining this ideal with contemporary politics, it becomes clear that “authenticity has 
been pressed into the service of rendering meaningful and helping to buttress distinctively neo-
liberal notions of personal responsibility and citizenship” (Foster 101). Narratives of the “self-
made” individual work to promote the assumption of identity as authentic while they 
simultaneously reinforce a culture of individuality in which people are expected to commodify 
the self. The models of gender identity that I explore in this paper thus rely on a kind of 
compulsory individuality to find their expression, in which movement towards the authentic self, 
I will argue, is accessed through the commodification of the symbolism of difference.  
 My theoretical stance, and that of this paper, is a constructionist one, which holds that 
institutions such as gender, as well as beliefs about them, are produced by the social (Fuss 4). On 
a theoretical level, I believe that constructionism best describes the relations of power that 
impact how identity may be formulated and expressed, especially in its application to narratives 
of essential or innate identity. While constructionism is often wielded to dismantle the assumed 
naturalness of essential identity, I believe it can also be effectively applied as an equalizer in 
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analysis, exposing how both claims of the authentic and the constructed nature of gender are 
predicated on the same basis of social production. The most famous advocate of this position as 
it applies to gender is Judith Butler. Though somewhat exaggerated in theory, her arguments are 
worth restating to foreground speculation about how they may be taken up in social relations. In 
her early and well-known works on gender, she proposes that  
[G]ender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it 
is an identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts 
[…] the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds 
constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. (519) 
In describing how gender is performative, Butler stresses that performativity is not synonymous 
with gender expression (externalizing or performing the self). This difference is important within 
constructionist theories because the notion of performativity itself implies that there is “no 
preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be measured; […] no true or false, real or 
distorted acts of gender, [as] the postulation of a true gender identity [is] a regulatory fiction” 
(Butler 528). If the very constitution of a gender identity is the performative acts that reference 
an established self, that self must definitionally be absent – there is, therefore, nothing internal to 
be expressed. Thus, constructionist theories of gender unsettle assumptions that are ingrained in 
contemporary understandings of subjectivity – they trouble desires to live authentic lives, to 
expose personal and corporeal truth, to have agency, to exist as a subject outside of the 
seemingly repressive forces of society. Constructionism exposes the non-existence of personal 
identity, making fragile our understanding of selves and others by furthering the theory to insist 
that performativity reveals identity as naught but “a compelling illusion, an object of belief” 
(Butler 520). In my experience, Butler’s and other constructionist theories are often taken up as 
weapons in the arsenal of queer critique, but are rarely reflexively applied to marginal identities 
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in the way that they are to dominant and oppressive systems of gender1. Rather, they are 
sometimes claimed as liberatory for subjects who cannot fit into dominant conventions of 
gender, with individuals perceiving their difference as indicative of their position outside of the 
system of performativity. The assumption that cultural subversion (or perceived lived experience 
of a theory) allows one to transcend the theory’s implications is a flawed conception that leads, I 
believe, to the conflation of constructionism with choice and heightened agency for queer and 
gender variant individuals. It is in this sense that constructionist ideas are taken up as part of the 
justification for genderqueer identities in cultural spheres, the destabilized state of naturalized 
hegemonic identities often serving (quite ironically) as the platform for the assertion of the truth 
of liminal identities. Constructionism’s assertion that society and its structures produce identity 
is liberating in the sense that it gives queer individuals access to an intellectually defensible 
attack against the groups from which they may feel personal oppression – it is useful in political 
arenas, and it represents a way of conceiving of society that allows for the “subversive” to feel as 
if they are truly acting against a normalizing system. However, constructionism is rarely applied 
to the full extent in analyses of queer identity; queer always seems to occupy the privileged 
position of opposition, without direct acknowledgement of the ways in which genderqueer and 
transgender identities may also be made up of complex series of citations that, while specific to 
queer aesthetics, still function as performative acts in Butler’s sense. It is through the lens of this 
critique that I analyze both the deployment of constructionism by people with genderqueer/trans 
identities, and the insistence on the rhetoric of essentialism that underlies even those 
constructionist leanings.  
                                                          
1 Butler does, in many instances, apply her theories to “queer” identities, but in ways that make problematic 
assumptions about many aspects of motivation and lived experience (see Prosser for an extensive critique). 
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 Reliance on essentialist narratives is undoubtedly a product of neoliberal models of 
selfhood that insist on the privileging of internal truth that comes with the exaltation of the 
unique individual. The notion of authenticity is used as a justification for all identities under this 
paradigm, from the hegemonic masculinity that is threatened by constructionist discourses to the 
non-binary subject who capitalizes on their moment of recognition. Especially in current 
“political correctness” and “free speech” debates, essentialism is used by all sides as a defense 
against attacks on that which is held personally dear by all – their innate (gendered) sense of self. 
This has been termed “strategic essentialism” in work on identity politics, and the deployment of 
such rhetoric for the purposes of debate and justification is clearly strategic and formulated as a 
direct response to discourses that strive to privilege the non-queer as natural and inherently more 
“real.” However, it is also common to hear claims of internal true identity circulating in queer-
specific spaces as part of an accepted narrative of queer and transgender identity formation: the 
recognition of the essence of the self remains the quintessential first chapter of every coming-out 
story. The presence of essentialist claims is not inherently a negative thing, especially when it 
allows marginalized groups access to the social capital that comes with recognized realness. 
Transgender narratives in particular insist on the authenticity of gender categories (not limited to 
those of woman and man) because, as Prosser points out, “why hand over gendered realness 
when it holds so much sway?” (11). Here, it is helpful to consider Diana Fuss’ conceptualization 
of the essence as a sign, that is “historically contingent and constantly subject to change and to 
redefinition” (20). Employing this idea as part of a constructionist critique, it is possible to 
access another sense in which queer and trans subjects deploy essentialism even as they are 
informed by the deconstruction of hegemonic identity: realness functions as a sign, confirming a 
place in the reality of the social order. This application of essence as sign can come into play 
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strategically (for the benefit of an audience of the non-queer majority) or personally (to define a 
subject position from which to act). Working within this theory, essentialism loses some of the 
negative connotations that it has gained from feminist and queer critiques. No longer 
fundamentally reductive, the use of essence as a sign becomes “predicated on the subject's 
complex positioning in a particular social field […] the radicality or conservatism [of such use] 
depend[ing], to a significant degree, on who is utilizing it, how it is deployed, and where its 
effects are concentrated” (Fuss 20). Thus, while the use of essentialism in transgender narratives 
has been critiqued by some queer theorists, it is rare, in my experience, to find queer and trans 
people who will condemn claims of essence in their community members, as these claims are 
generally perceived as earnest, as beyond respectable doubt, and as not necessarily reproducing 
harmful gender essentialisms. To theorists like Prosser, and those who locate meaning in 
embodied experience, the destruction of realness that constructionism enacts is more dangerous 
than leaving notions of gendered realness (including their inherent patriarchal and 
transmisogynistic leanings) in place. “What gets dropped from transgender in its queer 
deployment to signify subversive gender performativity,” Prosser claims, “is the value of the 
matter that most often concerns the transsexual: […] the materiality of the sexed body” (32). 
Evidently, essentialist claims that highlight the inherent truth of that bodily materiality are 
important not just as strategic ways of positioning the political subject, but as very personal ways 
of understanding the realities of one’s existence. In terms of application to non-transitioning non-
binary identities, I believe it would be a mistake to assume that the same models fail to apply due 
to a perceived difference in the visceral experience of embodiment. Rather, as I explored in my 
last reflection paper, a negotiation of embodied experience is arguably present in these identities, 
making analogous narratives of essential experience of embodiment and essential gendered 
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subjectivity accessible to these individuals. Even if (as I will explore below) non-transitioning 
identities are heavily influenced by and connected with perceptions of constructionism, the sign 
of essence remains an important tool for the translation of transgender subjectivities into cultural 
spaces.   
 Having discussed the roles of construction and essence in expressions of gender identity, 
I wish to extend my analysis to discourses of “choice” – or, rather, the conflation of 
constructionism with radical choice and self-construction. In most cultural narratives, choice is 
eschewed: one does not choose to be trans or queer for many reasons, including loss of 
sympathy, loss of realness in relation to a naturalized norm, and societal anxiety about what 
Gayle Rubin terms the “domino effect of sexual [or gender!] peril” (14). The deployment of 
essentialism – especially the many varieties of the “born this way” narrative – help to combat 
accusations of choice and the loss of cultural respectability that comes with it. More recent 
expressions of transgender identity, however, threaten to bring “choice” uncomfortably close to 
the surface. Many oppressive conservative groups have already recognized that this quality is 
easily attached to non-transitioning identities, resulting in the over-politicization of non-binary 
(as I have previously explored). These ever more frequent attacks that shake the foundations of 
all transgender subjects threaten to prompt a multi-front war as skirmishes over the boundaries of 
the trans community begin. Choice destroys the very notion of authenticity, and often prompts a 
visceral negative reaction in transgender people (including myself) because in its destruction it 
tends to leave the categories of cisgender man and woman intact as unchosen; it reveals the 
fragility and transparency of vulnerable groups while reinforcing the naturalness of the dominant 
ones. Choice implies a transitory nature, and non-permanence – the very accusation of “picking 
up and putting on genders at will” that gets lobbed at trans people repeatedly. The fear of being 
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defined by choice acts as a gatekeeping mechanism, causing countless trans people to rewrite 
childhoods and formative experiences into standards of proof, into empirical evidence. And 
while choice has the potential to be a disruptive force if wielded by trans people themselves, it 
remains so stigmatized as to not be acknowledged as a viable option at all. Non-transitioning 
identities have been particularity susceptible to the harsh critiques of being a “choice” in a way 
that is meant to undermine felt realness. They are vulnerable because, I believe, the only 
perceivable change (or transition) in identity is the claiming of a specific label. Labels are easily 
identifiable, even within queer communities, as choices – they can in no way said to be pre-
discursive, or to be generated by an internal truth. 
 How, if at all, should choice be acknowledged as a part of transgender identity formation, 
especially for the non-transitioning subject? The very implications of individual choice are 
problematic within a constructionist framework. The suggestion of a subject that precedes 
discourse and can exercise both awareness and agency in choosing what gender to “perform” 
represents a bad reading of Butler’s theory, and one that she has often argued against. However, 
it is possible to find a middle ground within performativity between individual choice and 
complete social imposition that displaces the subject. In fact, Butler suggests that “[t]he body is 
not passively scripted with cultural codes, as if it were a lifeless recipient of wholly pre-given 
cultural relations. But neither do embodied selves pre-exist the cultural conventions which 
essentially signify bodies” (526). If overt and conscious choice is not the best model to describe 
the way identities are formed and deployed in contemporary cultures, perhaps this tension 
between choice and cultural predetermination is. The “choice” that would then apply to non-
binary identities would not be the sort that is harshly critiqued, but would be a model of 
restricted choice that is defined by the culture that trans subjects exist within, which includes 
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predefined sets of labels, aesthetics, and discourses that are dependant on cultural intelligibility. 
In a more direct application, non-transitioning non-binary identities are expressed according to 
dominant conventions and aesthetics of queerness, collective notions of subversion, and 
discourses of identity that determine how subjects are able to access thoughts about their own 
identities. While, as Butler points out, “[s]urely, there are nuanced and individual ways of doing 
one's gender,” it holds true even for marginal subjects “that one does [gender] in accord with 
certain sanctions and proscriptions, [and it] is clearly not a fully individual matter” (525).  
 This understanding of identity formation within the bounds of culture, as a restricted kind 
of choice defined by the dominant discourses of queer communities, provides a new lens from 
which to view the issue of the symbolization of gender transition. Prosser was one of the first 
theorists to raise the issue of the adoption of the transgender figure by queer communities, 
claiming that these communities wanted to reap the benefits of transgender’s subversiveness 
while remaining disengaged from its embodied reality. He states:  
One wonders to what extent this queer inclusiveness of transgender and transsexuality is an 
inclusiveness for queer rather than for the trans subject: the mechanism by which queer can 
sustain its very queerness – prolong the queerness of the moment – by periodically adding 
subjects who appear even queerer precisely by virtue of their marginality in relation to queer. (58) 
This critique is still extremely applicable, as non-transitioning non-binary individuals (who seem 
to be able to unproblematically retain their identity as queer) are questioned for their adoption of 
a transgender sensibility without the definitive experience of dysphoria. While many of these 
critiques are fueled by personal ire, I believe that the accusations of symbolic implementation 
have theoretical validity as well. In the manner that Prosser suggests, transgender embodiment 
has come to signify the ultimate expression of queerness (one could go as far as to say queer 
authenticity). Especially due to the connections being made between trans identity and gendered 
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authenticity, queer subjects may not only be using transition as a symbol to affirm their own 
queerness, but to affirm gender ambiguity as the essential embodiment of queerness. This causes 
an erasure of what might be called “traditional” modes of transgender identity, even as it 
valorizes the queer subversion that is read onto gender “transgression”. If transgender is defined 
by bodily dysphoria and the desire to transition away from a gender position, as it has been for 
decades, then non-transitioning identities appear to only be employing some (the desirable?) 
facets of transgender identity while remaining outside of specific experiences of embodiment 
that have been integral to transgender people’s understanding of themselves for generations.  
 Perhaps a useful distinction to make to describe this phenomenon is that between identity 
and identification. Identity (while still being acknowledged as a construct) can be understood as 
a subjective, personal experience of selfhood that cannot necessarily be satisfactorily described 
by social labels. It is the essential reality that our culture pressures us to reveal and name. 
Identification, on the other hand, is the adoption of a set of social signifiers and the citation of 
dominant conventions. It represents the act of expression that is often thought to be intimately 
tied to identity, but does not have to be. This distinction can be summed up by describing 
identity as a mode of being (I identify as…) and identification as an affinity or attachment to a 
particular social position and its connotations (I identify with…). The difference between the two 
is often clearly defined by those who subscribe to narratives of bodily authenticity. Prosser talks 
about the fact that “[t]here is much about transsexuality that must remain irreconcilable to queer: 
the specificity of transsexual experience; the importance of the flesh to the self […] a particular 
experience of the body that can't simply transcend (or transubstantiate) the literal” (59). For 
Prosser, the transsexual possesses an identity while the queer (non-transitioning) subject simply 
enacts an identification with the tropes of transition and ambiguity. However, from a theoretical 
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perspective the line between the two is not entirely opaque. Working within a system of social 
definition, identification-with is a necessary step that must proceed the “realization” of an 
internal identity. Phenomenological precursors to performativity theory went as far as to define 
the body as “an active process of embodying certain cultural and historical possibilities, a 
complicated process of appropriation” (Butler 521, emphasis added). Indeed, the process of 
appropriation through identification is an apt way to describe the symbolization of transition that 
Prosser speaks against.  
 Appropriation describes “the representation of cultural practices or experiences by 
cultural “outsiders” [and] the use of artistic styles distinctive of cultural groups by non-
members” (Matthes 343). It most often applied to describe these occurrences between members 
of different ethnically-defined cultural groups, and has a strong presence in critical race theory. 
The problematic nature of appropriation is made clear when cultural symbols, usually invested 
with a great amount of meaning, are taken and reconfigured in ways which breed 
“misrepresentation, misuse, and theft of the stories, styles, and material heritage of people who 
have been historically dominated and remain socially marginalized” (Matthes 343). While 
acknowledging the genealogy of theories of cultural appropriation and the ways in which 
appropriation continues to harm many communities of colour and cultural minorities, I believe it 
is worthwhile to apply the concept to the potential appropriation of “transgender” by non-
transitioning individuals. The use of transgender as a label to describe non-transitioning 
identities may be a legitimate shift in the application of the label and the cultural experiences of 
gender. However, the pain and confusion prompted by the perceived infringement of non-
transitioning people onto hard-won transgender territory must be considered in a comprehensive 
theorization of how these shifts are taking place. Identification with the stylistics of transition, 
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and the act of aestheticizing and assuming the surface-level of subversion that is expected to 
accompany transgender identity, certainly qualifies as appropriation given the above definition2. 
This is especially true in cases where subversion is achieved without the concurrent violence that 
is often directed towards embodied gender ambiguity and transition. Cultural appropriation is 
generally thought to be harmful in scenarios where a member of a dominant cultural group is 
appropriating from a member of a marginalized group, and not vice versa, given the “nature of a 
dominant cultural group to dominate and impress its culture upon others” (Matthes 347). In 
many narratives of non-binary identity, this qualifier would nullify accusations of appropriation, 
as binary transgender people are spoken about as having several privileges that non-binary 
people do not (including institutional recognition and passing privilege). However, it is also 
worth returning to the ethos of Prosser’s polemic to consider the ways in which non-transitioning 
identities may constitute the dominant or privileged group in this paradigm (at the risk of 
foreclosing the idea that these identities are transgender, which is not my intention). Non-
transitioning identities claim many of the recognizable aspects of transgender narratives, but 
remain for the most part outside of the experience of being read as transgender. While self-
marking is spoken of by non-binary folks as a trial of constant misrecognition, it is questionable 
whether it should be compared to common experiences of violence and the everyday trauma of 
being read as abnormally gendered. Because of this discrepancy in the readings of bodies, non-
transitioning individuals also have more control over the contexts in which they reveal their 
identity. The spaces that are chosen are often digital ones in which the narratives of non-
                                                          
2 It is important to remember, in speaking of identification and appropriation, that under a constructionist framework 
these cannot qualify as acts of self-aware agency. Though identification is often juxtaposed with a more natural 
internal identity, and appropriation juxtaposed with the natural use of symbols in their native cultures, neither 
identification nor appropriation is an act that exists outside of the same cultural formations that create naturalness. 
Thus, it may be more accurate to consider appropriation not as an act performed by individuals, but as a system that 
plays a part in larger networks of identity formation. This distinction will be developed in later work.  
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transitioning identities are already culturally circulating and accepted. In these ways, it seems as 
if non-binary people who do not transition avoid many of the undesirable aspects of what 
transgender is perceived to be, all the while partaking in the desirable recognition of legitimate 
difference that comes with the increased awareness and celebration of all things trans. As the 
privileged group, non-transitioning people can be said to appropriate the cultures, aesthetics, and 
identifications of transgender – even if they are not yet the culturally dominant group.  
 What stands to be gained from the appropriation of transgender, and why does it appear 
to be happening at such rapid rates? In her work on identity politics, Jenny Bourne contributes to 
the description of the trend of claiming labels previously and currently associated with 
oppression (and, thereby, with social subversion): “Identity Politics is all the rage. Exploitation is 
out (it is intrinsically determinist). Oppression is in (it is intrinsically personal). […] Political 
culture has ceded to cultural politics” (1). Appropriation of transgender in a way that ties 
personal experiences of gender to larger narratives of oppression and subversion is one very 
direct way to access a recognized political position in current discourses. In fact, in neoliberal 
arenas personal experiences of oppression are defined as the only unproblematic positions from 
which to speak, and therefore appear necessary to the politically conscious who wish to combat 
noticeable oppression. The method of identification and appropriation that I have described 
above may represent an increasingly common way of creating a story about the self that accesses 
privileged authenticity, that plays within the bounds of the citations of performativity, and that 
reaffirms the place of the unique individual at the center of all political discourse.   
 It is my hope that the position of the non-transitioning subject will become continuously 
illuminated through examining the intersections of contemporary identity formation. In a 
moment when individuality is prized, both essentialist claims of authenticity and interpretations 
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of constructionism as liberatory are forwarded as part of identity narratives. The use of both 
discourses can be analyzed with an eye to their implications for cultural perception of 
transgender identity, and also to the complex system out of which these identities arise. Applying 
notions of choice, aesthetics, identification, and appropriation as part of a theoretical critique 
furthers this aim, but may conversely effect further divisions within an already fractured 
community by relying on essential differences between transitioning and non-transitioning 
subjects as a theoretical basis. In a moment of political tension that includes many of the 
personally motivated critiques I mentioned above, making visible the fault lines in a community 
imbues those fault lines with disproportionate significance. The current state of transgender 
communities has been noticeably impacted by the addition of identities that likely weren’t 
anticipated when the category was theoretically blown open in the 1990s, and the jury is out on 
whether these additions represent the beginning of a post-gender future or the downfall of a 
community defined by sweat and blood. As transgender individuals of every stripe become 
scapegoats in conservative attacks on neoliberalism, deliberations over relative realness become 
questionable. As I struggle to move theory into practice, I am wary of accepting a positive stance 
uncritically for the sake of inclusiveness. However, I do believe that theory may provide valuable 
tools in the definition of future paths. Adopting a constructionist stance, conceptualizing essence 
as a sign, and other equalizing techniques that I have attempted to employ may not only confront 
the use of division as a theoretical object, but will provide a commentary on the problem of self-
defined separation as a whole. While the theoretical framework I have used refuses ideas of 
uncontextualized self-definition, we as queer subjects maintain a measure of control over the 
intentions of our identity narratives and our actions. Remaining within constraints of the system, 
our intentions have impacts on the positions and strengths of the communities we align ourselves 
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with, and those that we separate ourselves from. As theorists, we should strive to destabilize all 
gender identities, or none at all. As queer and transgender people, it is time to commit to a 
radical transformation in our definitions of gender and build a community on this basis while 
retaining critical engagement, or to disengage with notions of difference that do not necessarily 
affirm our separate sense of self.  It is this nuance and balance that I hope to carry, as a lesson 
from this paper, into future work.  
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